E.R.Douglas. Temporality, Intentionality, the Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Causal Mechanisms of Memory in the Brain: Facets of One Ontological Enigma?

Temporality, Intentionality, the Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Causal Mechanisms of Memory in the Brain: Facets of One Ontological Enigma?

E. R. Douglas

1. Introduction

The three greatest metaphysical questions to confront humanity at the beginning of the twenty-first century are arguably: What is time? What is mind? What is the physical origin of the material universe? Each of these perennial issues has generated a colossal body of philosophical, literary and scientific investigation. However, as is so often the case in our overly complex epoch, an excessive emphasis on problem analysis, the methodological hallmark of the previous century, has also led to a paucity in the rigorous synthesis of such seemingly disparate issues. In this essay, I argue that these three questions have proven especially difficult to answer on account of a single underlying enigma, a riddle that turns on the nature of temporal transitivity and direction.

Investigations of such expansive questions are traditionally more customary in the humanities than in the sciences, but it is a central tenet of this essay that both kinds of methodologies are necessary to their possible resolution(s). In particular, I adopt the analytically motivated rigor of the sciences, maximizing the clarity of the disparate issues and concepts at hand, but also motivated by the humanities’ focus on the function of human agency in the pursuit of natural truth, I claim rational grounds for drawing a synthesis among the corresponding problem sets. So on the one hand, I attempt to explicate such diverse terms as, for example, time, intentionality, causality, memory and directedness – whose commonly understood definitions leave them too ambiguous and/or obscure for an analytically empirical methodology. On the other hand, while they prove under inspection to have a common conceptual thread, its empirical credentials depend for merit on the acceptance of the phenomenological relationship between the scientist and nature, or the philosopher and philosopheme, as itself legitimately evidential. While this step does not require an endorsement of Protagoras’s relativist claim that man is the measure of all things, we must nonetheless accept that he remains the measurer of all that we know.[1]

From the vantage of this interdisciplinary perspective, it becomes increasingly evident that physics, and the scientific Weltanschauung generally, is coming to a crossroads. While there remain many questions without definitive answers, science as most generally construed now comprises a patchwork of models and theories that collectively can speak to almost every conceivable issue in natural philosophy. Yet, internal inconsistency abounds, and I would further contend that at least mainstream science has overlooked a very important aspect of nature. Illustrating for the nonce with a metaphor that may yet prove more than mere metaphor, science has sketched the design of the cosmos, but the blueprints reproduced remain monochromatic; whereas nature in all its wonder remains demonstrably colourful.[2] Nonetheless, one can inscribe all the colours with a single ink – so the metaphor continues – and though it is disputable whether one can thus entirely characterize their natures, we should at least attempt such ‘scientific’ descriptions as completely, accurately and truly as possible.

In particular, I nominate three classes of ‘empirical’ phenomena that mainstream science has not sufficiently explored: consciousness, causality and psychological time. With respect to the first, it has been widely objected that purely physicalist, materialist and even cognitivist accounts can suffice to explain away (mental) phenomena qua phenomena (and in particular for our purposes, intentionality, but also notably, qualia or indeed the experience of colour itself). To the second, I ask: does causality as we perceive it actually equate with a statistical correlation between events as stipulated in most contemporary analytic accounts and, if so, how did the universe come to be, and what would that even mean? Finally, the third begs whether ‘time’ really reduces accurately and completely in all its forms to a static tableau, in spite of our manifest experience of temporality as profoundly transient and directed.

Each of these three problem sets is marked by several possible solutions, theories or philosophical approaches that one might adopt, some easier, some ‘harder’ or, indeed, some considerably more ‘colourful’ than others. The first and ‘easiest’ solution falls under the name of eliminativism in the philosophy of mind, but it generalizes to all three of the problem domains we are considering here. This view relegates all mental phenomena to instances of mechanistic brain chemistry, but we may regard its cousin theories equating cause with correlation and time with space respectively. The more difficult, but more colourful – ergo, I contend, more ‘empirical’ – approaches involve wrestling with the underlying hard problems of explicating the emergence and nature of consciousness and intentionality, temporal transience and direction, as well as the metaphysics of being, becoming and causality. Although I discuss some of the ‘colourful’ theories available to explain the emphasized phenomena endemic to each domain of inquiry, my focus throughout this essay remains primarily on distinguishing eliminativist solutions – which at root simply expurgate their respective ontologies of the problematic phenomena – from those that do not.

The ultimate thesis of this essay asserts that the apparent quandaries of these three introduced problem sets are really each facets of a single, underlying enigma, but I make this case through several lemmas or staged arguments. First, I link these disparate concepts (time, mind, cause) by first explicating their meanings and then identifying how directionality plays a central role in the interpretation of all three; this comprises the remainder of section one. Second, I remonstrate something of a collective bad faith marked by a tendency in the philosophical and scientific literature to explain the most difficult aspects of each of the problem sets by smuggling implicit assumptions from the other two respective problem domains. This discussion strongly emphasizes the concept of directionality and so also significantly informs yet a quasi-fourth quandary of import to the natural philosophy of time: the meaning, origin and nature of the arrow of time. This last matter figures prominently in the larger problematic, for, in contrast, none of the other ‘empirical’ phenomena I endorse (consciousness, apparent causality or temporal transience) has aggravated especially physical scientists so much.

From here, I contend that while there may not necessarily be clear a priori grounds to choose one class of explanation over another – i.e., ‘monochromatic’ universe over ‘colourful’ cosmos – to explain the three (or four) aforementioned quandaries, insofar as metaphysics motivates arguments introduced in natural philosophy, the principles invoked for one solution should be employed consistently across the other two problem domains. In this way, I maintain an all or nothing approach to eliminativism in natural philosophy; the cosmic models we endorse are either very colourful or very monochromatic, there is little room for compromise. However, the stage is thus set to revisit the issue of whether and how science should attempt to explain the ‘colourfulness’ of the cosmos, and from this more global, human perspective, I maintain a considerably stronger case presents itself for the affirmative on the first question through a kind of logical inter-corroboration of empirical evidence.

As for ‘how’ science should proceed, both the principle of parsimony and this weave of logical association between problem domains support theories able to resolve all the aforementioned difficulties synchronically. Although I mention a few promising scientific attempts to come to terms with these issues, a complete review of contemporary research lies beyond this essay’s scope; notably, I have had to omit due consideration to ideas stemming from Bohm’s implicate order – I could not do it the justice here it deserves. Finally, I would conclude this introduction with a small warning: although rigor is desirable, natural philosophy is neither mathematical nor empirical per se, and the discourse herein is less an analytical proof than a metaphysical sketch stencilled with plausibility arguments, all hopefully inducing further dialectical investigation.[3]

1.1 Chronological and Rhealogical Time[4]

It is no great exaggeration to say ‘time’ has as many meanings as token applications, and yet they do share a common essence – sufficiently, that most disciplines tacitly assume that their ‘temporality’ is similar, if not identical, to those of every other field. J. T. Fraser has made great inroads in explicating this semantic jungle of times, and his characterization of six sorts of temporality proves an excellent point of departure. (1975; 1987; 1996; 1998; 1999) Each is distinguished by the accumulation of novel properties and qualities which emerge in increasingly complex natural systems to form a nested hierarchy of times. This scheme has proven very useful and influential, so that one finds its trace etched across the sciences and the humanities; in particular, the physicist, Rovelli, employs it to argue that a final theory of cosmology will have ‘no time,’ since the most fundamental levels of reality lack temporal structure, congruent with Fraser’s atemporality. (Rovelli 1995) In most respects, their schemes agree; direction corresponds respectively with thermodynamics and life (biotemporality), and both tacitly regard the present or ‘passing now’ as a feature properly attributed to the time of (human) intentional agents (nootemporality).

However, I must begin by taking issue with these two properties, directedness and transience, as characterized above. They are in fact both present in Fraser’s lowest echelon, atemporality, and so by evolutionary extension pervade all of his levels. In contrast, Rovelli’s scheme highlights the formulae and physical models of his (meta-) physics, emphasizing the static and permanent, relegating transience to illusion. Moreover, direction finds no place in his scheme whatsoever, for the asymmetry and direction of time are not equivalent, as I show in the next section. Thus, all other similarities aside, Rovelli plays Parmenides to Fraser’s Heraclites, and to celebrate this difference, I introduce a category distinction between species of time to cleave the distinction sharply: any model or idea of time that invokes transience, even qua illusion, is rhealogical, and those that do not, but are static, are termed chronological. Moreover – and I argue this further in the next section – directedness appears to be a feature of all and only rhealogical models of time, whereas chronological time is devoid of such qualities. Thus, Fraser’s nested times are paradigmatically rhealogical, whereas all orthodox physical models are chronological.[5]

However, what precisely is this mysterious transience? This proves to be a surprisingly subtle question whose answer quickly extends beyond the scope of this essay, but a brief digression is in order. First, we may recall Taylor’s ‘Doctrine of the Similarity of Space and Time,’ wherein he claims everything that can be expressed about time can be transposed about space. (1955) While I do not agree with the thesis, it serves as a useful rule of thumb: if a particular characterization of time can be ‘spatialized,’ to use Čapek’s term, then it is chronological, but if not, then it is rhealogical. (1961) Second, and a little more precisely, transience is any instance of authentic change, which is to be distinguished from Newton-Smith’s ‘Goodman changes.’ (Newton-Smith 1980; Goodman 1977) Interestingly, Webster’s dictionary defines such arguably counterfeit ‘change’ as: ‘…concomitant variation in time and some other respect—Nelson Goodman.’ (1993) The problem with such a definition becomes evident in McTaggart’s celebrated analysis of time, wherein ‘…it would be universally admitted that time involves change.’ (1908) Thus, the Goodman definition proves circular and so permits a deflationary interpretation of change that puts it on par with such concepts as difference or variation.

The following example illustrates the problem. Consider two bottles of Chianti-Rufina standing next to one another on a table, one empty, the other full; there is a difference, but it would be obscure to claim there lies an authentic change between them. Yet, suppose the sense in which one finds them ‘next’ to one another is temporal, not spatial, for example, as seen in two still-lifes painted by an artist with a penchant for veritas – such ‘change’ is common fare. So, what qualitatively distinguishes these two cases – i.e., we say ‘spatial’ difference but ‘temporal’ change – or is the distinction purely nominal?[6] I identify at least two explicit features: authentic change and the direction of process. However, not wishing to beg the question before discussing direction, allow me to propose another definition of authentic change: a single token entity manifesting as two or more inconsistent types. In the philosophy of mind, a ‘token’ denotes a unique and particular or singular entity, whereas ‘type’ refers to a mould or form, such as the class of full wine bottles with ‘Chianti-Rufina-1998’ etched onto them. In the example above, the token is ‘this bottle of Chianti,’ and the two types separated by time are ‘full’ and ‘empty’ respectively.

While I choose to accept transience as inevitably involving an (onto)-logical contradiction, there are many who impugn such impossibility as absurd and, to their credit, not without good cause. In particular, a topic or object of discourse only makes (scientific) sense if one can characterize its nature in a formal language, whereas from an inconsistent phrase, anything and everything can be logically adduced, with all the pragmatic inadequacy this ‘explosiveness’ entails. Thus, the law of non-contradiction is a first law in logic that one only perilously transgresses, and I suspect this accounts for a good part of the reason why analytic philosophy has had such a difficult time coming to terms with temporal transience (and perhaps love).

However, recent work in ‘paraconsistent logics’ suggests this law is not inscribed in stone, though I have yet to find any of the developed logics satisfactory for the characterization of transience.[7] Nevertheless, there are grounds for hope, for the contradictions in question are marked by the order they are presented: i.e., while a full bottle may become empty, or an empty bottle might become full – both of which are only expressible in most logics as ‘bottle is full and empty’ or, equivalently, ‘bottle is empty and full’ – we only wish at most one of these contradictions to be true per instance. Thus, it may prove possible to control the aforementioned ‘explosiveness’ of our logic of transience by introducing a non-commutative operator – e.g., an ampersand with an arrow – that delimits verity to some, but not all, inconsistent expressions: e.g., in this instance, ‘Full(Bottle) &► Empty(Bottle),’ corresponding to ‘the full bottle becomes an empty bottle,’ could be true, but ‘Empty(Bottle) &►Full(Bottle)’ would remain false.

If this digression into formal logic seems a trifle pedantic to some readers, I would assure them that it is difficult to overestimate its importance here. The scientific community can only investigate those ‘colours’ of nature that it can articulate, disprove and corroborate clearly. Furthermore, with respect to temporal transience, something else very interesting appears in the logical arrangements I have been considering. It may be the case – possibly provable – that any logic capable of expressing transience in a useful manner will intrinsically comprise features that correspond in a natural way to what I introduce in the next section as directionality. If correct, it follows that all rhealogical models of time manifest direction. Moreover, such ‘direction’ may prove ineffable in purely chronological logics – i.e., those that do not permit sentences expressing the kind of inconsistency introduced earlier – in which case, only rhealogical models of time will be authentically directed. Such a mutual logical entailment remains conjecture for now, since the full arguments range beyond the scope of this essay. On the other hand, the views espoused here are hardly revolutionary; indeed, Kant long ago recognized the logical relationship implicit between direction, transience and inconsistency.[8]

1.2 Directedness and the Arrows of Time

This brings us to the issue of the arrow of time or, more precisely, the directedness of time. Fraser maintains that a ‘short arrow’ first appears in biotemporality, and Rovelli similarly attributes such to thermodynamics. (ibid.) However, there is already a direction intrinsic to all of Fraser’s nested hierarchy defined by the generative progression of evermore complex, nested models of time. This is thus well in accord with our working hypothesis that temporal directedness and rhealogical time mutually entail one another. Furthermore, I maintain there is in fact no directedness in any of Rovelli’s models of temporality; his arrow of time is only an asymmetry. To appreciate this, a clearer distinction between directedness and asymmetry should be drawn. Consider the following image: Does it define a direction?

Figure 1.

Anyone licensed to drive an automobile probably feels it does point to the right, but this is a cultural artefact, a mere convention. On the other hand, the property of asymmetry is rather intrinsic to the geometry of the shape itself, independently of our interpretation. Thus, while it may be that all instances of directedness may logically imply a measure of asymmetry, the inverse is apparently not the case.[9] This property of directedness begs further explication, but let us first consider it in the context of the arrow of time.

There is a rather extensive literature concerned with the so-called ‘arrow of time,’ but from the beginning, much of it fails even to recognize the term is a misnomer.[10] Really, there is a quiver of double-headed arrows, which are typically, but inexplicably, presumed to aim together at a single target, namely, the end of time, thereby supporting the contention that there is some intrinsic directedness to time. However, most of these putative arrows are mere asymmetries, as illustrated in the table below.[11]

1. Psychological arrow: a directed asymmetry reflecting the ‘feeling of relentless forward temporal progression, according to which potentialities seem to be transformed into actualities.’

1a. Ontological asymmetry: a determinate past contrasted with an open future.

1b. Epistemic asymmetry: exemplified by memory, that we know more about the past than the future.

1c. Causal arrow: the direction in which events as effects seem to follow causes.

2. Entropic asymmetry: associated with second law of thermodynamics.

3. Electromagnetic asymmetry: radiation never ‘converges’ on an antenna in phase, but frequently ‘emits’ thus: only retarded solutions of Maxwell’s equations, and not advanced ones, are real.

4. Neutral Kaon asymmetry: the neutral K meson anomalously decomposes into pions at a rate that varies with the temporal direction of the process.

5. Relativistic asymmetry: some world lines end (begin) at singularities in black holes.

6. Cosmological asymmetry: corresponding to the expansion or contraction of the universe—i.e., the big bang vs. the big crunch (or its lack, as the case may be).

7. Quantum asymmetry: disputatiously resulting in quantum measurement.

8. Biological asymmetry: corresponding to evolutionary features of biological systems and organisms.

Naturally, some of these arrows may reduce to or derive from one another, and this list is not intended to be complete; our concern here is with directedness, or its lack, and this becomes yet more transparent in the following thought experiment. Suppose that after much laudable science, seven independent asymmetries were discovered to remain: Which direction does time tend? If each is thought to point in one of two directions, then there would be 2⁷= 128 possible combinations, and in only two would all seven converge. The moral of the story is that ‘forward’ is trivialized as conventional, and so most research on the arrow of time only concerns the asymmetric distributions of properties across space-time; it says nothing about temporal directedness. (Price 1996; Sklar 1974: 355-60) The only feature of time that clearly incorporates an intrinsic direction is its perceived flux! Thus, we should proceed carefully, for much like Augustine’s celebrated dictum about time, that we only know it when we do not ask too much of it, closer inspection similarly reveals directedness to be a surprisingly Janus-faced concept.

1.3 Causality, Intentionality and the Mathematical Infinite

Thus, let us broaden the scope of our investigation and consider all possible instances of directedness in our experience. In the first category, I take it as given that we (human beings) all perceive the passage of time as directed. We may designate a second class, if we accept a generative theory of causality into our physics (cf. 1c in the previous table), for then the cause-effect relationship is also directed; i.e., causal events may exist independently of their corresponding effectual events, but the latter only exist (are generated) through the action of the former. However, the vast majority of instances of directedness fall under the third grouping, intentionality, either explicitly or implicitly.

The term ‘intentionality’ finds most of its employment in the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of mind, and its definition and nature are highly disputatious. Nevertheless, ‘about-ness’ is an approximate synonym, and we are referring to intentional relationships when we say a word is about its denotation, a thought is about its content and an image is about whatever it reproduces. In each case, there is nothing physical, but the metaphysical significance of language, signs, and thoughts begs further explanation. Although intentionality is generally regarded as an essential component of consciousness, its etymology suggests a more general interpretation: the Latin word, intendo, means ‘to point at,’ which is rather how Aquinas and his medieval, scholastic colleagues employed it in their metaphysical musings. Such directedness remains in the signification of contemporary ‘intentionality,’ for the about-ness relationship is intrinsically uni-directional: e.g., the word ‘wine’ may be about the preferably red liquid often found in glass bottles, but it is nonsensical to suppose such a beverage is about a four-letter concatenation.

Now, thinking back to the right-handed arrow that figured earlier, a little reflection finds almost all instances of perceived or posited direction are conventional. This means they derive their putative direction from the way we, as intentional agents, interpret them; they are secondary qualities, to use Locke’s nomenclature. Thus, most empirical instances of direction vicariously reduce to such a phenomenological subclass subsumed under intentionality, without which all conventions would cease to exist. One might well argue that all instances of directedness are dependent on intentionality in this way, but that presupposes directedness is always a secondary quality, hence extrinsic to the natural order, and this is refuted by the intrinsic directedness of intentionality, qua natural kind. Nevertheless, the onus remains on us to demonstrate which instances are intrinsic to nature, where directedness proves to be a primary quality. Besides intentionality itself, the only physical possibilities seem to be time and causality, and only provided they respectively prove to be rhealogical and generative.

This completes my inductive argument with respect to ‘physical’ instances of direction, but there still remains a putative fourth category that bears mentioning. Certain mathematical structures intimate direction, at least as symbolically expressed. Prima facie, an infinite sequence of points with a proper limit form a set that can only be articulated in one direction; i.e., the sequence (1, ½, ⅓, ¼,…) with 0 as a limit cannot be expressed beginning with its end point. Yet better examples may be found in logic, such as recursively constructed Gödel-sentences. However, even if there exist mathematical objects as natural kinds (Platonism), it is still not self-evident in what sense the referents of mathematical language are directed, for such appearances may result from the choice of mathematical language employed in their description, in which case the directedness would be a secondary quality and so subsumed under intentionality. On the other hand, this seems less plausible with respect to the Gödel sentences noted above, whose construction might well demonstrate an ostensible intrinsic directedness that belongs to some kind of existent symbolic domain – if Platonism proves correct in this way. However, mathematical realism can take still several forms, many of which do not affect the pursuant arguments of the next section significantly.

1.4 Memory and Time

Memories are variously the thoughts, feelings, signifiers and other instances of manifest information that refer to events properly attributed to the past. As such, they compose a subspecies of intentions, but they have a double relationship with time. Firstly, as intentions, they are intrinsically directed, and I will argue that this entails an intimate relationship with rhealogical temporality. Secondly, they comprise an important subset of intentional vectors that refer to (define?) the chronological past.

Thus we find a curious metaphysical circularity in the way memory and time support and refer back to one another. Past events and entities prove the most ambiguously existential (actual) of all potentialities, since their status in this respect is largely derived from memory. Yet, the liminal reality of that-which-has-gone-before is essential to the causal determination of all present identities, including the very intentional agency that creates those memories. Thus, the following three questions are posed: How does man create memories? How do memories and the past correspond? How does the past determine man? Such circularity suggests that memories, along with their symmetric counterparts, expectations, play an especially interesting role, both in the marriage of rhealogical and chronological temporalities – whose union we may call ‘time’ – and in the metaphysical integration and explication of mind and body. Moreover, because memories are arguably ostensibly empirical, they demonstrate the deficiency of contemporary scientific theories to account in ‘monochromatic’ terms for the spectrum of ‘colourful’ mental phenomena evident in nature.

2. Synthesis of Rhealogical Time, Intentionality and Causality

I have thus far argued inductively that these three categories are sufficient to account for all physical instances of directedness, and I have conjectured with some supporting rational that transience and the (directed) arrow of time mutually entail one another. We may now turn to three further methodological arguments, each respectively linking our conceptions of time, causality and intentionality together into a larger logical-conceptual synthesis. The first shows a general correspondence between models of generative causality and rhealogical temporality; the second correlates such causality with intentionality; and the third argues that our ontological commitments to intentionality and time are strongly interdependent. This sets of the stage for last section’s conclusions about the natures of memory, agency, physical reality and time.

2.1 Temporality and Causality

If the model of time employed to describe a set of events is genuinely directed, this suffices to introduce directedness into a causal scheme on those events. Similarly, a genuinely directed theory of causality suffices to construct a directed model of time.

Causal theories come in two shades: either they are generative (colourful) or correlative (monochromatic). Aristotle’s views exemplify the former, whereas Hume’s paradigmatizes the latter; the key difference lies in that correlative, ‘scientific’ causality does not qualitatively differentiate between counter-factual causes and causes simplicitor, undermining the important intuition that causes precede effects, but not visa-versa.

The inability of such ‘scientific’ models of causality to demonstrate intrinsic direction appears to result from their underlying assumptions, which allow them in general to be expressed in a first order language. For if we suppose T_C is such a causal theory with axioms, events {e_i} and n-relationships C(causes; effect), in general, an inverse theory T_C^-1 is constructible that is satisfied by the same structures as T_C; i.e., Mod(T_C) = Mod(T_C^-1). This is accomplished by defining C^-1(effects; causes) so that is satisfied. Such formalism is simply a long-winded way of articulating how the causal arrows between events can be reversed without injury to the expressiveness of a first order causal theory, because the direction of the relations between events are superfluous to the correlations, as illustrated below:

Figure 2.

Yet, we wish to explain the origin of the apparent direction and order of the many causal relationships we commonly experience. Hume grounded such structural features in temporality as he experienced it, which was psychological, hence transient and rhealogical. (Hume, 2000) Similarly, most contemporary theories follow suit, for as Reichenbach observed, ‘Time… represents not only an ordered series generated by an asymmetrical relation, but is also unidirectional. This fact is usually ignored. We often say simply: the direction from earlier to later events, from cause to effect is the direction of the progress of time.’ (1958: 138-39) And, indeed, if time describes a manifold with an engraved direction and includes every physical event, it follows trivially that the said direction maps onto any subset of those of events characterized in a causal theory or relationship. Thus, rhealogical time suffices to account for the directedness of causality.

This state of affairs would all be fine and well, but the problem deepens considerably when an origin for temporal direction is sought. As discussed earlier, the physical arrows of time provide no answers, and a suitable scientific account founded on a chronological conception of time has proven sufficiently vexing, that several thinkers have rather attempted to derive the latter’s structure from the ‘natural’ order and direction of causality. (Bunge 1959; Tooley 1997;1999) Indeed, if we suppose the cosmos is composed of some set of events arranged as a directed causal lattice, its order and direction can be homomorphed back onto those events, introducing a directed structure to time. In this case, two events are said to be ‘simultaneous’ if-and-only-if they are identical or do not belong to any common causal chain, and an event is said to ‘precede’ another if-and-only-if it precedes that other causally on such a chain. Finally, the temporal orientation of an event corresponds to the direction of causal relations to which the event belongs. Thus, the directedness of an ontological account of causality suffices for a corresponding structure of time.

However, the articulation of a directed causal theory is fraught with the same logical difficulties facing the explication of rhealogical time. As the logical argument and illustration above make abundantly clear, any meaningful, generative causal theory will require new methods and formalization. It is perhaps for this reason that, by and large, generative theories of causality found their greatest circulation in the pre-Leibnizian – and so pre-symbolic and pre-scientific – era of the medieval scholastics. And overlooking these factors in would-be generative theories of causality has tended to undermine some of the most interesting attempts to explain our experience of time.

Finally, let me conclude here with a brief note on so-called ‘backward causation,’ which is code in much physical literature for time travel into the past, and which also indicates how physics largely understands the structure of time to derive from the causal relationships between events. Leaving the issues associated with causal paradoxes aside for now – the rhealogical-chronological modelling of time may shed much light here, but the discussion would take us too far a field in this essay, since it begs important questions about freewill – there are no significant problems introduced to this account of the relationship between time and causality. If an event in a directed causal sequence of events is also its own cause, then the structure introduced onto time will be circular and closed, but directed all the same.

2.2 Causality and Intentionality

Naturally occurring causal directedness suffices to account for the directedness of intentionality. Similarly, the directedness of intentionality suffices to explain the appearance of causal directedness in nature.

Intentionality is a primary property of consciousness and, adopting a naturalist position, is generated from a composite of processes and elements in the (human) brain. Explaining the emergence of consciousness from matter has a long history as the mind-body problem in philosophy, and it has shown itself remarkably resilient to resolution. However, if we accept that mind supervenes on the physical body and brain, then the web of experiences, feelings, memories and thoughts must map into some corresponding set of embodied processes. If those underlying parts then interact in a genuinely-directed causal manner, it follows that such interactions will similarly transpose onto the elements of mentality, providing a plausible account of the directedness of intentionality.

Let us consider an example that does not stray too far from a number of current cognitive theories. Let M₁ be an experienced memory that reminds us of another memory M₂, and each intentionally signifies some objects, O₁ and O₂, which in turn likely signify other memories or experiences, which in turn refer to yet other objects, O₁₁ and O₂₁, etc.. Ultimately, I postulate such a chain of signification yields a web of objects, which at certain loci start to take on the characteristics of physical events, E₁ and E₂, the putative referents of memories, M₁ and M₂. When these events actually occurred – so the theory goes – they left causal impressions on the brain, affecting brain states, B₁ and B₂, though both are also affected by all the elements of the chain of objects. Per our assumptions above, these are the two physically instantiated brain states upon which our two respective memories putatively supervene. There is then a web of relationships – which, in vivo, would be complex to a degree beyond description – but isolating an absurdly simplified example, I illustrate below the different kinds of directed relations to consider, namely, intentional (unbroken lines), causal (dashed) and mixed:

Figure 3.

I propose here that the origin of the direction of intentionality naturally obtains from the directedness of physical causality. This follows directly for the M₁-M₂ mental relation of remembering, since it is isomorphic to the B₁-B₂ physical causal relation. Similarly, the E₁-E₂ about-ness relationship, for example characterizing the signifier and signified of a word and its imagined association, may similarly derive its direction as an analogue of the original B₁-B₂ relationship. The M₁-O₁ and M₂-O₂ intentional relationships, which seem to tend against the grain are more subtle to explain. However, all of the objects, O_xy, synchronously represent both physical brain states and quasi-mental states (many perhaps not properly conscious as such), and so there are ample resources to sum over the many interrelated vectors to produce the requisite directedness. Nevertheless, what is most significant to appreciate from this illustration is that the directedness of intentionality need not be miraculously generated ex nihilo. Thus, a genuinely directed theory of causality suffices to explain the origin of intentional direction.

We might pause to consider here whether the reverse does not also obtain, that intentionality might similarly account for the apparent directedness of causality. Indeed, the logic appears symmetric. However, it resembles the highly mystical metaphysics of many pre-scientific cultures, for the causal interactions of physical processes then result from the dynamics of purely intentional, spirit-like entities, manitous. On the other hand, just because an idea is old does not mean it is irrelevant.

Alternatively, there is an epistemic correlate to the previous ontological argument. Since all theories of nature are conceived through the lenses of intentional minds, it is not such a stretch to claim we anthropomorphize and baptize a direction as the direction. This remains especially plausible so long as physics remains ambiguous on the matter, which indeed it does:

Figure 4.

Above, ‘causally’ related events (E), experienced states (S) and physical phenomena of some asymmetric class (X) are all respectively simultaneous at times (t). Such asymmetric ‘arrows’ are the closest contemporary science comes to explicating causality, but they all fail to account for its apparent directedness, whatever may be claimed.[12] The alternative anchors our experience of causality in our psychology, though the ontological origin of its directedness is then begged of intentionality itself. Nevertheless, whether it is physics appealing to intentionality and psychology for the apparent directedness of causality, or psychology referring back to physical causality to ground the directedness of mental processes, both demonstrate an intimate relationship between domains.

2.3 Intentionality, Consciousness and Rhealogical Time

The genuine, intrinsic directedness of intentionality is sufficient to account for the apparent directedness of time. On the other hand, if time is genuinely directed, it suffices to account for the directedness of intentionality.

Cartesian dualism splits mentality and physicality in a way that almost perfectly parallels the schism between rhealogical (psychological) time and chronological (physical) time. However, here it becomes important to distinguish between consciousness and intentionality, which is arguably only one important aspect of the former; others include qualia, agency, freewill, and self-consciousness. Similarly, the directed arrow of time is only one aspect of rhealogical temporality, which also comprises such other aspects as transience and the distinction or dimension of actua et potentia. Now, a satisfactory analysis (and subsequent synthesis) of these two domains is beyond the scope of this essay, but a few remarks may suffice to sketch the argument.

Mentality derives much of its physical significance from its capacity to realize the future and past in the present, through memory, prediction, differentiation, association, identification and other intentional actions. How does it do this? Indeed, the physical significance of one workman calling out to another, ‘slab!’ – to recall Wittgenstein’s example – correlates strongly with the likelihood that the other will in fact give the first a slab in the future. (1958) Without wishing to oversimplify a matter that is really considerably more complex, an important way intentionality obtains physical significance lies in connecting agency, identity and signs in the present moment with events of the past and future and, moreover, predictably affecting the constitution of that future.[13]

In sum, I claim thus that a conscious agency without an intrinsic capacity to refer or associate in a unidirectional manner would, nevertheless, be able to recreate that directedness if it were subject to rhealogical process in time. Here, the identities of all elements, physical and mental, are subject to a uni-directional evolution – i.e., they either persist or they change – provided we accept the conjecture introduced in section 1.1. However, it then follows that an association between two possible identities belonging to different moments of time are distinguishable in that the one can become the other, but not vice versa. From here, all species of directed intentions, including memories, can be created and recreated through the faculties of creative imagination and identification. Again, the difficult step is to derive an initial directedness ex nihilo, and the posited directedness of time provides the needed pigment to colour the remainder of the ontology.

Suppose on the other hand we imagine the reverse scenario: a universe devoid of rhealogical temporality, but inhabited by intentional agency. Interestingly, Weyl describes such a world when he famously writes,

The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward along the lifeline of my body, does a section of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time. (Weyl 1963: 116)

Here, time is characterized as purely chronological, but can consciousness survive embedded in such a spatialized block-universe?[14] I contend that it is not possible and so conclude that rhealogical time is essential to consciousness and intentionality.

Assuming the postulates of cognitivism for the nonce, mentality derives from information instantiated in some physical material, whether that be carbon-based biology, silicon-based technology or wood-based tinker-toys. Since the choice of material is inconsequential, I will follow Leibniz’s example and choose wood on aesthetic grounds to construct a hypothetically sentient machine.[15] Indubitably, such a ‘consciousness’ would be massive and complex, but engineering issues aside, its design falls within the parameters of cognitivism, the popular view today in those academic circles dedicated to creating artificial intelligence and explaining the evolution of mind in the cosmos. Thus, let us baptize him ‘Tinky,’ the timeless, tinker-toy boy. Now, what environmental conditions are required for Tinky to tick?

Presumably, at each chronological moment, Tinky realizes a corresponding physical structure, so that his genidentity is composed of a series of states foliated along the ‘temporal’ dimension space-time. However, as time is chronological, it has equivalent properties with space. Thus, there is no reason to believe Tinky’s psychological constitution would be affected by transposing his physical parts onto spatial dimensions only. Admittedly, some contortion may be necessary, but we may assume enough ‘temporal’ thickness to maintain his structural integrity. Now, the problem is to identify, in principle, any indication of Tinky’s sentience in this static, spatialized state; even a hint of the directedness intrinsic to his putative intentionality would suffice.

However, isolating his intentionality’s physical origin in such a crystallized, inert state is absurd. His genidentical body is composed of alternating regions of space and material at best asymmetrically distributed. What geometric form can, even in principle, signify directedness? Any mark or pattern like ‘_►’ that we might discover uncovers nothing because, as discussed earlier, such symbols do not intrinsically signify anything, least of all direction. Whatever ecstasy Tinky experienced during his short lived temporal interval, there remains no corresponding physical trace of it or his intentionality, contretemps with cognitivism. Thus, I conclude that the constitution of memory and intentionality apparently require more than material and information; some tertiary ingredient is required, and the most plausible candidate is the directed process of rhealogical time.

3. Conclusions

Time, causality and intentionality intersect in many ways, sharing structural symmetries and ontological-existential similarities, but no scientifically established theory is available to explain them. However, their global and synthetic consideration together suggests a deeper ontological relationship, as illustrated below:

Figure 5.

I have considered how these three doubled arrows coalesce and how each finds resolution in the other. Thus, each individual plausibility thesis contributes to a collective corroboration of the others, and it suggests strong grounds that the directedness of causality, time and intentionality all share a common ontological origin. This view has been espoused by others, such as J. R. Lucas, albeit argued differently, but it has yet to be aggressively pursued.[16] This results in a great part, because so little is really understood about the brain, mind and time. Yet,

Time is the brain’s glue… The experience of time is a neurophysiological construction that is generated actively within our brain, but how this is accomplished no one really knows… the sense of time follows from intentionality but the links that translate such a neural process into a subject experience are unknown. (Modell 2002, 34)

Indeed, there is growing recognition that these ‘perennial’ mysteries are related.

So, where does that leave us in this search? Firstly, I have argued that we are in fact searching for a single underlying principle. Secondly, this translates into refining the methodological approaches adopted in each domain, that they better cohere. Thirdly, and most central to my thesis, each of the three aforementioned domains bears sufficient similarity that we should adopt a similar epistemic attitude toward them all.

Thus, if one feels compelled to adopt mental eliminativism, which is akin to claiming there is no intentionality, then the same view should be employed to characterize time and causality. Similarly, a purely chronological modelling of time or a blanket prohibition on directed causality will undermine the other two, respectively. On the other hand, if one finds the experience of self-consciousness, time or physical causality as directed more convincing, then it behooves one to meditate carefully on the natures of all three. In this way, a stronger empirical case is presented on account that evidence for any one of the three problem sets becomes evidence for all three, and this very much undermines such eliminativist views to my mind. Not only does the world appear in spectacular Technicolor, ‘monochromatic’ theories that deny it are now trebly wrong.

However, in tracing the ontological and theoretical relationships between these three puzzling domains, more than such a denial follows. The similarity between these quandaries suggests that whichever approach one adopts in one domain, methodological consistency would demand a similar epistemic attitude towards the other two. Thus, if a mysterion view of mind seems closest to correct in the case of consciousness, corresponding antirealist accounts would best serve in explaining the natures of time and causality. Similarly, functionalist interpretations of any one of the three problem sets should stand or fall together with corresponding theories in the other domains. By extension, we may then include such paradigms as mechanism and materialism.

I remain tentatively optimistic about the potential of science to uncover much of the underlying nature of temporality, causality, and intentionality. However, this will only become possible once its institutionalized monochromatic glasses are removed and some of the most difficult questions resolutely posed: e.g., what is directedness and where does it come from? Although its definition is subtle, its empirical merit and pragmatic value are not easily denied. Moreover, as noted, mathematics indirectly expresses directedness in some of its formalisms. So, features of the universe necessitating models with such formalisms suggest themselves for further research.

However, if such colour proves finally beyond the purview of a strictly monochromatic science, at the least, I leave the sciences and the arts and humanities somewhat better defined and delineated, if not bridged. In that unhappy future, the sciences can continue to treat time as an empty chronological canvas, the mind as an inconvenient distraction from the truth and causality as code for the many statistical correlations that compose the cosmos. And the arts and humanities?

Wonderful colours.